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And what if all of animated nature
Be but organic harps diversely framd
that tremble into thought
COLERIDGE: THE EOLIAN HARP
In the 1960s a modest revolution took place in the study of visual
perception that had a vague but meaningful connection with the wave-
particle duality of light in physics. It became clear that there would be an
advantage in looking at phenomena such as visual contrast, acuity, color,
and shape perception, not only from the conventional object-oriented point
of view, but from a spatial frequency perspective as well. A new line of
research emerged: the traditional measurement of visual acuity by means of
Snellen charts and Landolt rings, for instance, was supplemented by having
people stare at displays of sinusoidally light/dark modulated spatial
gratings, making acuity amenable to dynamic systems analysis. This
approach has been reviewed in detail by Olzak and Thomas (1986).
At roughly the same time a reverse development took place in
auditory perception, where frequency had always been the natural mode of
representation. Initially stimulated by J. J. Gibsons (1966) ideas about
ecological optics and affordance, the concept of acoustic object
penetrated into auditory psychophysics. A major role in this development
was played (by Bregman, 1981, 1990). As a result of Bregmans work on
auditory scene analysis we have gained a deep understanding of the
relation between a musical object, say a bassoon, and the stream of
auditory information that specifies the essence of what makes a sound
pattern emerge as the scene of a bassoon-being-played-on, standing out
perhaps even in the middle of the dense pattern of sound waves that is
produced by a symphony orchestra.
This research illustrates that the simple relation between period and
frequency, T = 1/f, lies at the root of a deep phenomenological distinction
characterizing the dual nature of temporal experience, the distinction, that
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is, between continuant and event or between duration and continuity
or between interval and rhythm.
A cognitive framework
In the past most studies on the perception and production of brief temporal
intervals followed the tradition of the psychophysical school of time
psychology (Michon and Jackson, 1985). Only in the course of the last
decade or two we have seen a gradual shift away from the strict paradigms
of temporal psychophysics towards a more explicit cognitive approach.
Several variations on popular mainstream cognitive themes can be
distinguished, including dynamic attending (Jones and Boltz, 1989; Large
and Jones, 1999), perceptual dynamics (Freyd, 1987; Freyd, Kelly, and
DeKay, 1990), and code theory (Leeuwenberg and Buffart, 1978; Van der
Helm, 1988). But even the work that stays close to the original tradition is
undergoing such a change of perspective, suggesting that the dual nature of
temporal experience has taken hold at last in the domain of cognitive
psychology.
The received view of human cognitive activity has emphasized a
distinction between automatic and consciously controlled information
processing (Schneider and Shiffrin, 1977) although more recently many
have come to prefer the terms implicit and explicit instead (Schacter, 1987,
1996). The temporal information that is being processed in either mode
may be contained either in the real time perceptual input or in the
simulated time input that resides in memory. This suggests 2 × 2 modes of
information processing (see Figure 1). The differences in outlook provided
by each of these processing modes are suggested by comparing such
characteristics as the basic conceptual chunks involved, the temporal
correlates, formal processing characteristics and conceptual analogies that
are used to describe and analyse a temporal input.
When these distinctions were first made in the mid-seventies, the
possibilities of incorporating them into deep theory were quite limited.
Most models were formulated in a qualitative fashion. That is, research
aimed primarily for results that would be at least qualitatively consistent
with assumptions about the mechanisms underlying a particular
phenomenon, be it streaming, anticipation, or synchronization. More
recently, however, the rapid progress in computing power has led to an
unprecedented growth of the experimental and formal sophistication of
studies in music, time, and rhythm, allowing a much more quantitative
approach that does better justice to the dual nature of time experience.
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Figure 1. The dual nature of temporal experience
There remains a good deal of conceptual continuity. Despite all
methodological progress the theoretical issues that motivated much of the
research in the perception and production of rhythm in the 1960s seem to
still be around and appear far from solved. This section on Tapping and
Synchronization is illustrative in this respect, not only because of the
concrete results the authors present, but also because their presentations
reflect the changing ways in which researchers tackle the questions how
people perceive and produce series of isochronic or patterned intervals and
why they deviate from strict regularity in doing so. These questions had
already drawn my attention early in the sixties, at a time when finger
tapping and time perception studies enjoyed a modest popularity which
gained momentum with the publication of Fraisses landmark monograph
Psychologie du Temps (Fraisse, 1957), but perhaps to an even greater
extent as a result of the studies of Frankenhaeuser (1959) and Treisman
(1963). My own contributions at the time were the introduction of timing
as a means of measuring the mental load of various perceptual-motor
tasks (Michon, 1966) and the description of timing behavior in terms of
linear dynamics (Michon, 1967).
In those days the tools of non-linear dynamics were still far from
being applicable to the study of complex skill, partly because the
computational means required for numerical solutions of non-linear
equations that we now have at our disposal were nowhere in sight. A
serious further limitation of linear dynamics is that any factor one cannot
force to linearity by appropriate experimental constraints (e.g., small
signal linearization) must be subsumed under the residual terms of ones
equations. Non-linear dynamics allows  a treatment of various factors that
influence performance but that are otherwise difficult to control
experimentally.
Limits of stationarity
This development makes it possible, for instance, to begin discussing the
cognitive origins of drift, which I see as the principal merit of Madisons
contribution (even though the author appears to prefer a more formal
methodological perspective). Madison takes a close look at the fact that in
producing a sequence of intervals subjects will, almost without exception,
drift away from the intended rate. He presents evidence indicating that this
drift may be described in terms of pink or 1/f  noise, which would seem to
be compatible with an explanation of these results in terms of biological
mechanisms. As some of the authors results seem to be better in line with
1/f2 than with 1/f (see his Figure 3 on p. 107), an explanation that is
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consistent with the latter type of noise would perhaps offer an interesting
and behaviorally plausible alternative. This so-called brown 1/f2 noise
describes a mechanismof which Brownian motion constitutes the
prototypical exampleof the kind one would expect to operate in this case.
Subjects may well choose a standard based on some of their most recent
performance and then display random variations relative to that standard.
Characteristically the fluctuations of this standard will be slow relative to
the variations of the actual series.
Whilst empirical evidence to support this position is limited, the
thought as such has occasionally surfaced during the last 25 years. Thus,
already in 1972, Vroon reported a series of temporal tracking experiments
focusing on the drift phenomenon (which, at the time, he called the
lengthening effect). On the basis of his findings he was able to rule out
several explanations. Among other things he established that drift is
independent from the intensity of the auditory stimulation (introduced as a
way of manipulating activation level) and from resetting instructions.
These and similar findings carried him to the conclusion that:
...the central factor is the estimation process itself. The data lead to the
conclusion that the last trial has to be considered as the only basis of
lengthening. The last estimation is continuously experienced as too long or
too short, and the resulting corrections lead to the described compensatory
actions (Vroon, 1972, p. 233)
Vroons results do indeed suggest a mechanism that is consistent with the
local  push-and-pull nature of brown noise and that depends very much
on local information affecting decision making, memory strategies and
sequential response biases (Vroon, 1972, p. 234).
Recently Panissal (1998), looking for a supra-modal mechanism
underlying the processing of interval information, reported results that
may be considered consistent with this view. Although Panissal made an
effort to attribute her results to a single mechanism, it is a likely possibility
that the severe experimental constraints she imposed on her subjects had
forced them to act as if their behavior was driven by one timing mechanism
only. In addition, only highly experienced subjects acted consistently with
her single-mechanism hypothesis. In contrast, the results of naive subjects
were better in line with a two- or three-mechanism hypothesis. This raises
the question who are, in fact,  displaying normal temporal abilities of the
human species: is it the naive subjects or the highly trained temporal
experts? Can it be that in normal everyday life two or three timing
mechanisms are active that are eventually superseded by a single
mechanism, as a result of a long and involved period of interval training
and the constraints imposed by the experimenter? And, still in this context,
when and how does interval-related information give way to frequency and
phase-related information?
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Limits of synchronization
In their contribution Wohlschläger and Koch continue this debate, more
specifically in the context of what they call the synchronization error, a
specific aspect of tuning performance. When a person produces a series of
regularly spaced stimulus taps in synchrony with a pattern of clicks,
subjects tend to tap 20-60 milliseconds before the click with which they are
synchronizing. One may wonder whether this really should be considered a
synchronization error: professional musicians make elaborate use of it in a
highly controlled and systematic fashion (e.g., Rasch, 1981). As before,
several factors may influence this result: the pacing signal, tempo, effector
organ, feedback, and practice. Wohlschläger and Koch review various
attempts at explaining the nature of the negative synchronization error: the
P-center hypothesis, the afferent-efferent conduction time difference
hypothesis proposed by Paillard and Fraisse, and the sensory accumulation
model suggested more recently by Gehrke, Aschersleben, and Prinz (1998).
The latter resembles the explanation offered by Paillard-Fraisse, but it rests
on an additional assumption regarding the integration of sensory
information. As a result the sensory accumulation model should be able,
among other things, to explain that intense taps lead to a reduced negative
synchronization error, a finding that seems to be at an angle with Vroons
(1972) finding, mentioned above, that stimulus intensity does not affect
timing performance. On the basis of their results, however, Wohlschläger
and Koch come to the conclusion that neither of these three explanations by
itself is sufficient to explain the negative synchronization error. They
summarize their position by stating that it might be that the
synchronization error is an effect that occurs under artificial laboratory
conditions, in other words an artifact.
Limits of phase correction
Repp raises the T vs. f question in the context of  phase error correction. He
concludes that phase errors are continuously compensated for, even if they
fall below the temporal order threshold and regardless of whether they are
due to a stimulus perturbation or to response variability alone. The
temporal order threshold is thought to impose limits only on conscious
perception, not on the processing of temporal information for motor
control. This claim is substantiated by assuming that there may be a
preconscious stage of temporal perception that is directly coupled by
entrainment to motor control mechanisms. This is an assumption that has
come to play a central role in Large and Jones recent analysis of dynamic
attending (Large and Jones, 1999).
But thresholds being what they areranges of uncertain outcomes
is what they arehow is the temporal order threshold to be valued?  Since
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the days of Hirsh and Sherrick (1961) it has been fixed at approximately 25
milliseconds. Yet, if we take more of the cognitive surroundings of our
experiment into account again, then the question arises, to what extent the
experimental conditions play a role in Repps results. Warren and his
associates (Warren, Obusek, Farmer, and Warren, 1969; Warren and
Obusek, 1972), for instance, demonstrated that linguistically and musically
meaningful sounds show vastly lower temporal order thresholds than
meaningless sounds such as beeps, screeches and hisses. In the latter case
the temporal order threshold even turns out to be of the order of 150
milliseconds.
Importantly for our present discussion, Repp argues that frequency
and phase perception are essentially different from duration perception.
And as he points out, an unanswered question thus far is whether there is a
smooth transition from one mode of perception to the other. Such a
transition constitutes the conventional assumption. Fraisse, for instance,
suggested a perceptual shift from rhythm perception for rates above 2 Hz
as opposed to interval perception for periods of 1 second and more
(Fraisse, 1957). The alternative would be that mechanisms for period
perception and frequency/phase perception are complementary. In that case
the choice of perceptual mode would depend on the nature of the temporal
task. As Repp argues, this requires experiments that question both modes
for the same stimuli.
Limits to temporal ratio
Franûk, Mates and Nátová focus on an ancient question that played an
important role already in Saint Augustines incisive analysis of experiential
time: Why is it that rhythmic groups regress to simple combinations of
long and short intervals and how do we compare these?
So far as sense can make things plain I measure a long syllable by a short,
and I feel by means of my senses that it has twice the length. But when two
syllables sound one after the otherthe first short, the next longhow shall
I keep hold of the short one? How in my measurement  shall I apply it to the
long one, so as to find that the long one has twice its length? [...] I cannot
make this judgment except when both the syllables have gone into the past
and are finished. Therefore, what I am measuring is not the syllables
themselves (they no longer exist) but something in my memory which
remains there fixed. (Augustine, c. 400/1972 , bk XI; 27).
Phenomenally the 2:1 ratio turns out to be almost indestructible. Even
groups that are widely off this mark, such as 5:1:1 for instance, can be
perceived perceived or (re)produced as a simple 2:1:1 group. Altogether it
seems clear that stable representations of more complicated ratios depend
on higher order perceptual and intrinsic pattern structure (e.g., Garner,
1962, 1974; Povel, 1981, 1985).
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Franûk et al. come to grips with this problem by forcing their
subjects to either double or halve their speed of finger tapping. They find
systematic deviations from the exact rates that support earlier findings
related to the indifference interval (a range of greatest precision around 500
ms) and the time-order error (overestimation of short intervals and
underestimation of long intervals, relative to the indifference interval). The
authors offer a range of possible explanations for these results, but also
make it clear that further experiments, especially of hypothesis-falsifying
kind, are needed.
The authors also generalize Saint Augustines question in an
interesting way. They argue that a tempo stored in the memory of, say, a
musician, is likely to influence a timing task but that experimental
psychology has failed to study such influences. I concede that it is
important to study the effects of stored (encoded) temporal relations on
actual inputs, but I am less convinced than the authors that this is an
entirely unknown area of psychological investigation. It should be
rewarding to look for inspiration in areas like motor skills, natural
computation and non-linear dynamic modeling.
Robot in search of a time sense
Of the various contributions in the section on Tapping and
Synchronization, the contribution by Eck, Gasser and Port is most closely
related to the approach that takes its point of departure in non-linear
dynamics. Their paper raises a number of fundamental issues relating to
modeling in general, issues that stood out in pretty much the same way in
the ancient linear-dynamics approach I mentioned earlier.
The authors claim that the process of learning to be rhythmical can
be best studied by building a robotic model. In one important sense I agree
as
...one should eventually be able to provide the design specifications for an
intelligent system that, by dealing with a dynamic environment, could
succeed in timing its mind and also, by explicitly manipulating its temporal
experience, might be said to be minding its time (Michon, 1989, p. 19)
From the cognitive perspective such a robot should be constructed on the
basis of assumptions about the functions that can generate its (goal-
directed) behavior, rather than representing it, in bottom-up fashion, as a
Turing-style match between a real persons output and the robots output.
This requires an a priori computational theory sensu Marr, (1982) or,
similarly, a rational analysis sensu Anderson (1993; see also Oaksford and
Chater, 1998).
The dynamic model Eck, Gasser and Port present in their
contribution consists of a mass-spring robot arm that is driven by a small
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network of neural oscillators with fast coupling, leading to entrainment.
They use a weak heuristic for model building, one that essentially consists
of selecting properties one by one that mimic an aspect of the empirical
phenomenon. This bottom-up strategy induces them to consider the
perception and production of rhythm as the prototypical model for
handling temporal information. This is the classical engineering approach
to systems identification which, unfortunately, without further functional
constraints offers no guarantee that the selected properties will work in
combination and do all the things one is hoping for and  importantly 
only these things.
Also the idea that beat induction would qualify as a benchmark
domain for studying the timing interactions between brain, body, and the
external world may be too optimistic. As I have argued many times before,
I think that staying tuned to the dynamic events in the world around us is
the ultimate foundation of our temporal existence which, as such has a very
long and essential evolutionary history (e.g., Michon, 1985, p. 20). Falling
out of tune with the world is simply and instantly fatal. It is with reference
to this tuning function that a rational analysis must be carried out. Elements
of such analysis are emerging in the literature; relevant examples, in
addition to some chapters in the present volume, are Brown and Vousden
(1998), Large and Jones (1999), Large and Kolen (1999) and Port,
Cummins, and McAuley (1995), to name just a few that are directly
relevant to the present discussion.
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